Necessity of Causal Judgments and particular laws of causation
Sahar Heydari Fard
Kant had been faced with a ground braking critique, based on causation, which could be terminated by attenuation of metaphysics and science in general. Distinction between a priori and a posteriori judgments and proving the possibility of metaphysics and science as a priori synthetic knowledge, was his response to such critique. He introduced a system in which judgments could be granted as necessary, according to a priori concepts of understanding. One of these concepts is causation, which he introduces as the principle of temporal sequence according to the law of causality.
In this paper I will argue that the law of causality is divided to general and empirical law of causality. General law of causality earn its necessity from the fact that, even observing temporal sequences, require the concept of causation, yet, particular laws of causality cannot be necessary in this way. Accordingly, science should answer how it can have necessary judgments such as “ A is the cause of B”.
In the first section I will address the main problem in more detail, and the following section the Kant response toward the general law of causality would be discuss.
Chapter three is basically about the meaning of causation. Also some objections will be introduced, which they are basically referring to the necessity of having particular causal laws in order to solve such problem.
I will demonstrate the role of particular laws of causality, also to what extent they could grant necessity to the favorable answer, in next two chapters.
1.Methodological formula for making laws
Observing what is happening in science, Hume and all empiricists may consent, there is a methodological instruction for making a law. Repetitions or regulations observed in nature, such as 'all events type A followed by events type B', in addition to the necessary law of causation, namely all events have a cause, will derive an empirical law, such as events type A could1 be the cause of events type B.
Indeed, as Hume contended, in a higher level, same procedure holds for the general law of causality2. The law of causality in general has been derived by observing frequent association of all events with another event prior in time, however there is no necessary element to make it necessary. Based on this problem, Hume makes a distinction between “relation of ideas” and “matter of facts”, or in Kant terms between “analytic” and “synthetic” judgments. According to such distinction, knowledge based on merely analytic judgments, namely metaphysics, would be unproductive. On the other hand science, which is devoid of necessary element, would be uncertain and vain. Since, the necessary element of laws, namely the Law of causation, is not necessary in it self as described earlier, would be an instance which refers to analytic synthetic disconnection, and absurdity od metaphysics and science in...