In Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part X, Philo have questioned how it is possible to reconcile God's infinite benevolence, wisdom, and power with the presence of evil in the world. “His power we allow is infinite: whatever he wills is executed: but neither man nor any other animal is happy: therefore he does not will their happiness. His wisdom is infinite: he is never mistaken in choosing the means to any end: but the course of Nature tends not to human or animal felicity: therefore it is not established for that purpose.” (Hume, 87) Given the presence of evil, we must either conclude that God wishes to prevent needless suffering, but cannot, in which case God is not all-powerful, or we may admit that he does not wish to prevent evil in which case we may conclude that God is not infinitely benevolent. Or, alternatively, we can conclude that he both wishes and can prevent evil, but that he is not wise enough to know how to arrange the world so that there is no evil, in which case he is not infinitely wise.
Philo’s argument of the incompatibility of God’s existence with the existence of evil is valid, because of the following:
Philo’s argument has the premises which are God is infinitely wise, powerful and benevolent is true. The existence of evil shows God must lack either infinite benevolence or powerful or wisdom. If we assume these premises are true, then the conclusion God does not exist is true. A valid argument is one on which, if we assume the premises are all true, the conclusion must be true. Therefore it is a valid argument.
It is an unsound argument, because the premises of this argument are not true in fact: the existence of evil cannot show that God must lack either infinite benevolence or powerful or wisdom. Because if God is infinitely perfect, which means he has power and wisdom to make the world that non-existence of evil, and he is benevolently want make the world that non-existence of evil, but God is possible have good reasons for allowing evil to exist that, in his mind, outweigh the desirability of the nonexistence of evil. So Philo also offers an answer that we can allow that God's infinite perfection and the evil of his creation can be reconciled in some unknown way. A sound argument is a valid argument whose premises are all true in fact. Therefore, this argument is unsound.