Limits of Mediation: Sudan Peace Mediation
Is the Sudan peace mediation by IGAD the answer to the questions of whether the mediators are guaranteed by the conditions and demands how about the parties to the conflict or can they strike out? With little contemplation as to the alternative or consequences the IGAD mediation team did chose to be in bound by the parties.
Something exceptional was the Machakos Protocol which was short and the vision was very far limited, upon which was supposedly based on by the DoP. The Nakuru framework was totally condemned by the GoS, which was seen as the next attempt. The peace process was meant to be limited as the message came out clear, as one of the negotiator stated ‘step by step’ while the leading role was played by the Sudanese parties.
The University of Nairobi student CC AA was near to the truth and stated that at the time of the emergence of armed insurgency groups in Darfur did expos the narrowness of the Naivasha peace agreement (Kenny, 2004), as well Sharath Srinivasan came up with almost the same conclusion
IGAD was pushed towards a full peace agreement and planning for peace as the International community was overwhelmed. In February and April 2003 there were recommendations that unnecessary advocacy was a peace spoiler this fetched in calls for a greater focus on Darfur. In October 2002 an extensive strategic hardware and personnel support flowed from the SPLM to Darfur rebels from 2002 onwards, yet conflicts in Darfur and the IGAD process did interconnect
A rapid agreement in the south had to be reached which was the best way to conclude the conflict in Darfur, this was stated by Sumbeiywo who was followed by many analysts. (Kenny, 2004, de Waal, January 2005, and various reports of ICG).
The limited prospects of presumptuous the major role in the centre they felt had a right to be based on their region’s large population, the Darfurian rebel leader accentuated on self-determination. Former Prime Minister Sadig Al-Mahdi in the wake of signing the CPA stated the parties have, ‘clad themselves in a kind of iron jacket that is not capable of accommodating others’ (IRIN, 5 October 2005).
When the mediators and the US together with the cronies understood the likely dangerous significances of such a tapered mediation and the boundaries obligatory on any peace process that would track in its wake, this question is not pleasingly answered. (Ryle, 2004.)
Such problems would have incurred if the Sudan IGAD Peace secretariat had the mandate and finances to hire resources people to yield their own independent analysis, but this was not done at all. In the aftermath of the Machakos Protocol an extensive tour of Sudan was done by the General Sumbeiywo where he did met leaders of the opposition partied and the SSDF
‘I would go earlier in the negotiations to the ground, to find out what the people want, this was said by the Special Envoy which is not essentially the same as what the...